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NLRB Rulemaking: Political Reality
Versus Procedural Fairness
Under the Administrative Procedure Act' (APA), federal administra-
tive agencies have a choice between rulemaking 2 and adjudication 3 as
procedures for formulating agency policy.4 The National Labor Rela-
tions Board5 (NLRB) traditionally has relied on adjudication to de-
velop its policy. Although this exclusive reliance on adjudication has
been sharply criticized,0 the Supreme Court unanimously has affirmed
1. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706, 1305, 3105, 3344, 5362, 7521 (1976).
2. The APA provides for two rulemaking procedures, formal and informal. Formal
rulemaking, governed by §§ 556 and 557, generally requires an oral hearing. Id. § 556.
Informal rulemaking is governed by § 553. Under informal rulemaking the agency is
required to give general notice of the proposed rulemaking and to provide an opportunity
for interested parties to participate through written submissions. Id. § 553.
3. Under the APA, adjudication involves more elaborate procedures than either formal
or informal rulemaking. In addition to providing an oral hearing, id. § 556, the agency
must give timely notice to parties entitled to notice and must insulate hearing examiners
from ex parte consultation, id. § 554.
4. See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 290-95 (1974) (NLRB has discretion
to announce new standard in adjudicatory proceeding); cf. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S.
194, 201-03 (1947) (upholding right of SEC to develop standards through case-by-case
adjudication rather than rulemaking). But see NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759,
762-66 (1969) (agencies possessing rulemaking authority may not be free to rely solely on
adjudication).
Because the APA's definitions of rulemaking and adjudication are quite broad, see 5
U.S.C. § 551(4)-(7) (1976), it is difficult to draw a workable distinction between the two.
See, e.g., Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development of
Administrative Policy, 78 HARv. L. REV. 921, 924-25 (1965) (rulemaking is open-ended
process addressing classes of persons or practices, whereas adjudication determines legal
status of particular parties or of their acts or practices).
5. The NLRB is an independent agency charged with the administration of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-166 (1976).
6. The Board's practice of relying solely on adjudication has been criticized by
numerous authorities and commentators. See, e.g., Congressional Oversight of Administra-
tive Agencies (NLRB): Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 916-18 (1968) (Henry J. Friendly)
(NLRB's failure to engage in rulemaking source of many of its administrative problems)
[hereinafter cited as 1968 Hearings]; K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATIsE § 6.17 (1970
Supp.) (rulemaking superior to adjudication for formulating policy); Bernstein, The
NLRB's Adjudication - Rule Making Dilemma Under the Administrative Procedure Act,
79 YALE L.J. 571 (1970) (rulemaking more equitable and efficient lawmaking procedure
than adjudication); Peck, The Atrophied Rule-Making Powers of the NLRB, 70 YALE L.J.
729 (1961) (NLRB's ad hoc case-by-case policymaking process no longer justified). The
policy also has been criticized by the American Bar Association, see 16 AD. L. REV. 77
(1964) (ABA House of Delegates unanimously recommend NLRB "comply with the rule-
making provisions of the [APA] in issuing contract bar rules and in other appropriate
areas'), by Board members, see 1968 Hearings, suPra, at 345 (Joseph A. Jenkins) ("I know
of no rational reason why [the Board] should not use their rulemaking power."); cf.
Miller, Administrative Decision Making-Mortal or Immortal? 25 HASTINGs L.J. 1131 (1974)
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the Board's decision to proceed through adjudication rather than rule-
making.7
Congress recently has begun to consider proposals that would require
the NLRB to engage in some rulemaking.8 The debate over whether
the NLRB should formulate policy by rulemaking or adjudication has
focused on the procedural benefits and disadvantages of a shift to
rulemaking. Although commentators have examined the political cli-
mate in which the NLRB operates and the ways in which adjudicatory
lawmaking9 shields agency policies from congressional and judicial
scrutiny, these factors have never been evaluated systematically in light
of the NLRB's role in developing national labor policy.
This Note reviews the NLRB's stated reasons for relying on ad-
judication and the scholarly attack on the Board's rationale. The Note
shows that the effect of the NLRB's reliance on adjudication has been
to minimize congressional and judicial intervention in the Board's
policies. The Note argues that any attempt to mandate NLRB rule-
(former Chairman of NLRB) (judicial function of NLRB should be given to courts), by
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, see, e.g., Bell Aerospace Co. v. NLRB, 475
F.2d 485, 495-97 (2d Cir. 1973) (Friendly, J.), rev'd in Part, 416 U.S. 267 (1974); NLRB v.
Majestic Weaving Co., 355 F.2d 854, 859-61 (2d Cir. 1966) (Friendly, J.), and by several
United States Supreme Court Justices, see NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759,
762-66 (1969) (Fortas, Stewart & White, JJ., & Warren, C.J.); id. at 775-80 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting); id. at 780-83 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (NLRB violating APA in issuing new
standard through adjudicatory proceeding).
7. See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 290-95 (1974).
The Supreme Court's position on the propriety of adjudicatory lawmaking is somewhat
unclear. In Bell Aerospace, though split on other grounds, the Court unanimously held
that the Board may announce new principles in an adjudicatory proceeding. Id. at 294.
Quoting extensively from SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947), the Court held that
the NLRB required the administrative flexibility allowed by case-by-case adjudication to
meet the varying problems of administering its mandate. 416 U.S. 290-94. Curiously, the
decision cited NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759 (1969), as support. 416 U.S. at
293-94. The Wyman-Gordon Court strongly criticized the NLRB's practice of promulgating
rules through adjudicatory proceedings. Six Justices stated that the Board must issue its
rules in accordance with the rulemaking provisions of the APA. 394 U.S. at 763-65, 775-
83; see note 6 supra (listing Justices). The meaning of Wyman-Gordon was itself confused
by the plurality view that the NLRB order was nevertheless enforceable because the
Board had specifically directed the respondent to comply with its policy. Id. at 766.
Justices Douglas and Harlan in dissent agreed with the plurality that the "rule" in
question was invalid, but vehemently objected to permitting the NLRB to apply such a
rule by ordering compliance on a case-by-case basis. Id. at 775-83.
The Bell Aerospace holding is all the more curious in light of a decision issued only two
months earlier, Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974), in which the Supreme Court lauded
the benefits of rulemaking while holding that the Bureau of Indian Affairs, in promul-
gating a general assistance eligibility requirement, was required to comply with the rule-
making provisions of the APA. Id. at 232-36. Although Ruiz cited Wyman-Gordon for
support, id. at 232, Ruiz was not mentioned in Bell Aerospace.
8. See p. 987 infra.
9. Adjudicatory lawmaking is the process of formulating and articulating agency policy
in adjudicatory proceedings.
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making will increase this intervention and undercut the flexibility
required by the Board to adapt its policies to changing political condi-
tions. Because a politically responsive Board has several advantages for
the development of national labor policy, the Note recommends that
Congress not require NLRB rulemaking without first determining
whether the procedural benefits of rulemaking outweigh the disad-
vantages of a less politically responsive national labor policy.
I. Perspectives on NLRB Rulemaking
The NLRB's choice between policymaking by adjudication or by
rulemaking traditionally is perceived in terms of a trade-off between
administrative flexibility and procedural fairness. This limited perspec-
tive obscures the political implications of rulemaking and the effect
these political factors have on the NLRB's ability to develop national
labor policy. Analysis of the political ramifications of a shift to rule-
making is necessary to understand the full impact of NLRB rulemaking.
A. The Traditional Perspective: Flexibility Versus Fairness
Agency choices between informal rulemaking and adjudication are
often controversial,' ° in part because the APA's directions on the use
of each procedure are ambiguous." No agency has taken as extreme a
position in choosing between the two as the NLRB. 12 Courts and com-
mentators who have urged NLRB rulemaking have advanced three
arguments: that rulemaking is a more equitable process than adjudica-
tion; that rulemaking increases the agency's access to relevant informa-
tion and facilitates future planning; and that rulemaking provides an
important political check on agency discretion.
The issue of procedural fairness and equity is at the core of the
10. See note 6 supra.
11. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(4)-(7) (1976) (defining rulemaking and adjudication).
12. Bernstein, supra note 6, at 574. The NLRB did publish four relatively trivial rules
between 1970 and 1973. See 29 C.F.R. § 103 (1979). By contrast, the Board handed down
2,759 decisions in fiscal year 1978 alone. 43 NLRB ANN. REP. 18 (1978).
Section 6 of the National Labor Relations Act empowers the NLRB "to make . .. , in
the manner prescribed by [the Administrative Procedure Act], such rules and regulations
as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this [Act]." 29 U.S.C. § 156 (1976).
There has been speculation that the NLRB's rulemaking authority does not permit it to
issue rules determinative of legal status. See Shapiro, supra note 4, at 960-61. The legislative
history of the Taft-Hartley Act indicates, however, that the language of § 6 of the NLRA
gave the Board substantive rulemaking powers. See Peck, supra note 6, at 732. The issue
of the Board's authority to engage in rulemaking was settled by NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon
Co., 394 U.S. 759 (1969), in which six Justices stated that the NLRB should use its rule-
making authority when issuing new standards. Id. at 762-66, 775-83.
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controversy.1 3 It is argued that NLRB rulemaking would better protect
interested parties than does adjudication by providing notice of pro-
posed policy changes and an opportunity to present written comments
or testimony.14 Rulemaking is said to promote more uniform treatment
of parties because irrelevant fact distinctions are ignored.'15 Finally,
proponents contend that making policy by rulemaking reduces the
problem of retroactive lawmaking. 16
Advocates of NLRB rulemaking also maintain that rulemaking pro-
vides the agency with fuller information. 17 Administrators may have
greater freedom under rulemaking to consult informally with outside
parties.' 8 Rulemaking also may reduce litigation over ambiguities and
inconsistencies in Board policy.' 9 Rulemaking presumably facilitates
13. Six Supreme Court Justices have agreed that the rulemaking provisions of the
APA are designed to ensure fairness, and cannot be circumvented by adjudication. NLRB
v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 764-65, 777-83 (1969). The Second Circuit has ex-
plicitly attacked the unfairness of rules issued in adjudicatory proceedings, e.g., Bell
Aerospace Co. v. NLRB, 475 F.2d 485, 495-97 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'd in Part, 416 U.S. 267
(1974), especially when such rules are applied retroactively, e.g., NLRB v. Majestic Weaving
Co., 355 F.2d 854, 859-61 (2d Cir. 1966).
The NLRB contends that its policy of accepting amicus briefs and issuing press re-
leases meets the fairness criticism. McCulloch, Procedures Employed by NLRB in De-
terinining Policy, reprinted in 1968 Hearings, supra note 6, at 1237, 1239. See generally
Peck, supra note 6, at 735-39 (tracing use of NLRB press releases). Most commentators
reject the Board's argument. See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 6, at 582-87 (most labor law
specialists unable to keep abreast of Board's caseload); Peck, supra note 6, at 757
(amicus briefs inadequate substitute for publishing proposed rules).
14. See NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 764-65 (1969); id. at 775-80
(Douglas, J., dissenting). Lack of notice in adjudicatory proceedings deprives potentially
affected parties of the opportunity to influence the agency before it promulgates the
policy. Bernstein, supra note 6, at 591.
15. See Bernstein, supra note 6, at 592.
16. See, e.g., K. DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT § 6.03 (3d ed. 1972); Shapiro, supra
note 4, at 933-35. Several prominent jurists have expressed a strong distaste for retroactive
lawmaking. See NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 780-83 (1969) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting); NLRB v. Majestic Weaving Co., 355 F.2d 854, 860-61 (2d Cir. 1966) (Friendly,
J.).
17. K. DAvis, supra note 16, § 6.03; Bernstein, supra note 6, at 591.
18. K. DAVIs, supra note 16, § 6.03. The law is not settled on the permissibility of
these outside contacts. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has
recently indicated that certain ex parte consultations in an informal rulemaking proceed-
ing may violate due process guarantees. See, e.g., Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d
9, 54-57 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977). But see Action for Children's Tele-
vision v. FCC, 564 F.2d 458, 468-78 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (refusing to apply Home Box
Office rule to formulation of general agency policy). For a discussion of ex parte con-
tacts in informal rulemaking, see Note, Due Process and Ex Parte Contacts in Informal
Rulemaking, 89 YALE L.J. 194 (1979).
19. See Bernstein, supra note 6, at 591. The impact of rulemaking on the amount of
litigation is, however, unclear. Rulemaking may encourage litigation by permitting in-
dividuals to challenge a regulation without first violating it if they can show that they
are plainly affected by its existence. Shapiro, supra note 4, at 941; cf. note 57 infra (dis-
cussing delay that might result from preenforcement review of new Board rules).
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the agency's planning because policymaking would be less affected by
the accidental order and type of cases presented to the agency.2
Finally, proponents of NLRB rulemaking argue that rulemaking
serves as a political check on agency power. They contend that the
greater specificity and clarity of promulgated rules, as well as the ad-
vance notice that rulemaking requires, makes agency rules more sus-
ceptible to scrutiny by other governmental bodies2' and by in-
dividuals, 2 2 and thereby promotes more responsible and democratic
administrative action.
The NLRB defends its use of adjudicatory lawmaking by citing the
breadth of its mandate and its need to develop complex rules with
maximum flexibility.2 3 The Board views rulemaking as a cumbersome
process that would impede its ability to respond to changing condi-
tions;24 adjudication permits rules to be developed gradually as new
fact patterns emerge. In addition, the NLRB maintains that a shift to
rulemaking would increase litigation, further exacerbating its already
heavy workload. 25
With the exception of the Supreme Court's opinion in NLRB v.
Bell Aerospace Co., 26 which upheld the Board's decision to proceed
through adjudication, the NLRB's rationale has been received with
open skepticism. 27 A number of commentators have demonstrated that
20. See Shapiro, supra note 4, at 932-33. Because the General Counsel has unreviewable
authority to refuse to issue a complaint, NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 138-
39 (1975), he theoretically is able to determine in part the type of cases presented to the
Board. He cannot, however, initiate unfair labor practice cases on his own motion. B.
MELTZER, LABOR LAw 97 (2d ed. 1977).
Rulemaking also facilitates planning by permitting administrators to focus on a few
critical policy issues rather than spreading their efforts over hundreds of cases. Bernstein,
supra note 6, at 591. At present, the Board issues almost 1,800 decisions in contested
cases annually. 43 NLRB ANN. REP. 18 (1978).
21. See K. DAViS, supra note 16, § 6.03 (congressional committees ineffective in
supervising adjudicatory lawmaking).
22. See, e.g., NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 777-80 (1969) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) (viewpoints and orientations of government administrators toward under-
privileged will not be adequately challenged without public airing of agency policy).
23. McCulloch, supra note 13, at 1237 (rulemaking too inflexible technique for diverse
factual situations governed by National Labor Relations Act).
24. 1968 Hearings, supra note 6, at 1662-63 (supplemental memorandum of NLRB).
It has been noted, however, that adjudication and rulemaking require roughly equal
amounts of time for developing agency policy. Bernstein, supra note 6, at 594.
25. 1968 Hearings, supra note 6, at 1662-63 (supplemental memorandum of NLRB);
see note 19 supra (rulemaking may encourage litigation).
26. 416 U.S. 267 (1974). For a discussion of the Court's decision, see note 7 supra.
27. Many scholars believe that "with the exception of the SEC, the NLRB is in the
best position to engage in rulemaking." 1968 Hearings, supra note 6, at 917 (Henry J.
Friendly). The Chairman's Task Force on the NLRB identified seleral areas that might
best be governed by rulemaking: supervisory status; time limits in misrepresentationf
rebuttal situations; payments to observers; unit determinations; expanding units; voting
rights of laid-off employees; and technical employees. CHAIRMAN'S TASK FORCE ON 'HrE
NLRB FOR 1976, INTERIM REPORT AND RECO.MMENDATIONS 30-32 (1976).
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the NLRB arguments against rulemaking are specious, that many
NLRB policies are highly inflexible, and that the Board mimics rule-
making procedures when it believes that a particular case requires
them.2s
Congress recently has begun to consider proposals that would require
some NLRB rulemaking. The Labor Reform Act,29 defeated by fili-
buster in the Senate 3 0 provided for extensive rulemaking in several
highly controversial areas.31 It appears likely that future labor legisla-
tion will include rulemaking provisions.
B. The Alternative Perspective
The NLRB's reluctance to engage in rulemaking raises perplexing
questions that previous analyses fail to answer. Commentators have
not explained why the Board categorically refuses to engage in rule-
making despite apparent efficiencies inherent in the rulemaking pro-
cess. The failure to analyze why the NLRB so tenaciously resists
academic and judicial pressures to engage in rulemaking appears to
result from the limited framework within which the rulemaking issue
has been studied-that of administrative flexibility versus procedural
fairness.
A broader perspective that incorporates the political factors con-
sidered by an agency in choosing between rulemaking and adjudica-
tion overcomes this analytical defect. Such a perspective suggests that
by making policy solely through adjudication the NLRB is able to
minimize congressional and judicial intervention in its policies and to
mitigate the impact of those intrusions that do occur. The inadequacy
of the present analytical framework is all the more acute in light of
the NLRB's role in developing national labor policy amidst the polit-
ically volatile setting of American industrial relations.
28. E.g., K. DAVIS, supra note 6, § 6.17 (1970 Supp.); Bernstein, supra note 6, at 587-98;
Peck, supra note 6, at 752-61; cf. 1968 Hearings, supra note 6, at 1662 (supplemental
memorandum of NLRB) ("[I]n appropriate cases, the NLRB follows procedures which
incorporate the asserted advantages of formal rule-making.")
29. Labor Reform Act of 1977, H.R. 8410, 95th Cong., Ist Sess., 123 CONG, Rac.
H10,714 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1977).
30. H.R. 8410 was adopted by the House of Representatives by a vote of 257 to 163,
123 CONG. Rac. H10,714 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1977), but failed to pass the Senate after six
rejected cloture attempts. The measure was recommitted to the Human Resources Com-
mittee, 123 CONG. REc. S9412 (daily ed. June 22, 1978), a move usually tantamount to
killing a bill. Labor Bill Recommitted After Sixth Cloture Failure, 36 CONG. Q. WEEKLY
RFP. 1599 (1978).
31. See Labor Reform Act of 1977, H.R. 8410, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3, 123 CONG. REC.
H10,714 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1977) (requiring NLRB to promulgate rules establishing access
of organizers to employees on employers' premises, determining appropriate bargaining
units, expediting representation elections, and regulating agreements on eligibility of
voters).
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Labor relations is one of the most polarized and controversial sub-
jects of national political debate.32 It is an area in which labor and
management exert tremendous political pressures in support of their
interests. 33 Well aware of the political sensitivity of labor legislation, 34
Congress has enacted only two major labor reforms since the National
Labor Relations Act35 (NLRA) of 1935.36 These legislative efforts are
both expansive in their mandates and remarkably ambiguous. 37 The
NLRB thus has had to apply statutes with often cryptic and con-
flicting legislative guidance. 38 But the Board's role has been more than
that of an agency merely fleshing out legislative standards; it has served
32. 1968 Hearings, supra note 6, at 522 (Howard Lesnick).
33. Id. at 522; Bernstein, supra note 6, at 597-98 (Board is "whipping boy without
rival"); cf. 1968 Hearings, supra note 6, at 818-19 (Frank W. McCulloch) (criticizing emo-
tional attacks to which both management and labor subject Board). See generally D. BoK
& J. DUNLOP, LABOR AND THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY 384-426 (1970); A. McADAMS, POWER
AND POLITICS IN LABOR LEGISLATION (1964).
34. See 1968 Hearings, supra note 6, at 522 (Howard Lesnick) (high intensity con-
troversy surrounding labor legislation makes it "too hot to handle"; Congress acts only
when public opinion solidifies behind major theme over extended period); cf. H.
FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 166-71 (1962) (Congress unwilling to
become involved in controversial matters even if acutely dissatisfied with status quo).
35. 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-166 (1976)). Popularly
known as the Wagner Act, the NLRA revised and extended § 7(a) of the National In-
dustrial Recovery Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 198, by providing legal protection for employees
who wish to organize for collective bargaining, and by establishing the NLRB. 29 U.S.C.
§§ 153, 157, 158 (1976).
36. Those two reform acts were the Taft-Hartley Act, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (current
version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-167, 171-187, 191-197 (1976)), and the Landrum-Griffin Act,
73 Stat. 519 (1959) (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 153, 158-160, 164, 186, 187, 401-531
(1976)).
The Taft-Hartley Act responded to growing postwar public concern about union
power by amending the Wagner Act to prohibit union unfair labor practices. Enacted
over the vehement objections of labor and the veto of President Truman, the Act re-
affirmed the national commitment to collective bargaining by leaving employer unfair
labor practice provisions virtually intact. B. MELTZER, supra note 20, at 32-34.
The Landrum-Griffin Act sought to curb union corruption and promote greater in-
ternal democracy. Id.
The latest attempt at major labor legislation was the Labor Reform Act of 1977, H.R.
8410, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. H10,714 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1977), which failed
to pass the Senate as a result of a filibuster. See note 30 supra.
37. See 1968 Hearings, supra note 6, at 522-24 (Howard Lesnick) (NLRB must in-
terpret and administer vague legislative standards); Winter, Judicial Review of Agency
Decisions: The Labor Board and the Court, 1968 SuP. CT. REv. 53, 56-60, 65 (many provi-
sions of NLRA offer little guidance on their application).
38. 1968 Hearings, supra note 6, at 522-24, 526 (Howard Lesnick); Winter, supra note
37, at 56-60, 65.
For an example of conflicting legislative guidance within the NLRA, compare § 8(a)(5),
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976) (employer required to bargain collectively with representatives
of his employees), with § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976) (good-faith bargaining requirement
does not compel parties to agree to proposals or make concessions). Both the NLRB and
the federal courts have had difficulty reconciling these two provisions. See, e.g., NLRB v.




as a means for adapting national labor policy to a continually shifting
political climate.3 9 Adjudicatory lawmaking, by enabling the Board to
minimize conflict with Congress and the judiciary, has permitted the
NLRB the flexibility to modify its policies as political conditions
change.40
II. Minimizing Conflict Through Adjudication
To understand the effect of rulemaking on the political responsive-
ness of the NLRB, it is necessary to analyze how rulemaking would
alter the roles of the federal judiciary and Congress in developing
national labor policy. Such an analysis shows that a shift to rulemaking
would increase judicial and congressional intervention in NLRB
policies, and thereby inhibit the Board from responding to changing
political circumstances.
A. Minimizing Conflict With the Federal Judiciary
Adjudicatory lawmaking permits the NLRB to develop its rules in
a form most likely to survive the keen judicial scrutiny to which labor
policy is subjected. NLRB rulemaking would give the judiciary a
greater role in developing national labor policy and thus would
produce a less politically responsive labor policy.
The appealability of all final Board judgments41 and the NLRB's
need to seek judicial enforcement of its orders42 have guaranteed an
influential role for the federal circuit courts in formulating industrial
relations policy. Virtually every Board decision is influenced by the
ubiquitous presence of the federal judiciary.4 3 In the recent past, more
than half the Board's unfair labor practice decisions have been re-
viewed by the federal appellate courts. 44 Although the circuit courts
acknowledge the NLRB's unique expertise in industrial relations, 45
39. See Winter, supra note 37, at 56-60, 64-67 (Board has often responded to political
change by reinterpreting its policies in manner consistent with political shift). Evidence
of the Board's political responsiveness can be found in the rapid reversal of NLRB
precedents as the Board's composition changes. See 1968 Hearings, supra note 6, at 136
(Cornelius J. Peck) (Kennedy Board overruled Eisenhower Board so quickly that labor
reporting service opened index entitled "Prior decisions overruled by the Board"); cf. id.
at 17 (Sen. Robert P. Griffin) (criticizing NLRB's "shifting interpretations of the law"
from election to election).
40. See pp. 998-99 infra.
41. 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1976).
42. Id. § 160(e).
43. F. McCULLOCH & T. BORNSTEIN, THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 117 (1974).
44. Id. at 116.
45. See Getman & Goldberg, The Myth of Labor Board Expertise, 39 U. CH. L. REv.
681, 681-84 (1972) (court opinions abound with references to Board expertise, although
discussion of how such special competence was acquired is rare).
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such judicial deference is only nominal. Roughly one-third of the 300
NLRB judgments annually ruled on by the federal judiciary are
reversed, modified, or remanded.4" The federal judiciary's traditional
activism in determining national labor policy results in it frequently
substituting its perception of how the American industrial relations
system should operate for that of the NLRB.47
An agency subject to such exacting judicial review would prefer to
formulate policy through adjudication instead of rulemaking for several
reasons. One advantage of adjudication is that it permits the agency
to make policy decisions in the guise of fact determinations. The like-
lihood of judicial acquiescence to policy decisions is higher when the
decisions are submerged in the facts of a given case. When an agency
can stress its role as the original trier of fact, the chances of its decision
prevailing are greater. 48
In addition, the NLRB can use adjudicatory proceedings to "pro-
mulgate" ambiguous, flexible rules that do not present the court with
a clear and precise statement of policy. The agency can thereby avoid
having a rule that the judiciary strongly favors transformed into in-
flexible doctrine from which the agency can neither advance nor
retreat.49 Similarly, a court uncomfortable with a rule is far more
likely to overturn the rule on the ground that it is beyond the agency's
statutory authority if the rule is clear and firm. 50 Policy made by rule-
making is generally more precise and more carefully articulated than
policy made by adjudication, and thus is more vulnerable to such
attack.
Adjudicatory lawmaking has the further advantage of allowing an
agency to choose the case in which a policy will first be appealed to the
46. 43 NLRB ANN. REP. 282 (1978) (in fiscal year 1978, circuit courts of appeals af-
firmed in full 218 (65.5%) Board orders, modified 53 (15.9%), remanded in full 8 (2.4%),
affirmed in part and remanded in part 7 (2.1%), and set aside 47 (14.1%)).
47. See F. MCCULLOCH & T. BORNSTEIN, supra note 43, at 117-20 (judicial intervention
in affairs of NLRB too extensive); Winter, supra note 37, at 67-74 (criticizing willingness of
judiciary, particularly Supreme Court, to second-guess Board); cf. H. FRIENDLY, supra note
34, at 36-52 (discussing effect of various judicial decisions on Board's specification of its
standards).
48. Shapiro, supra note 4, at 946-47. What an agency views as a per se rule may be
read by the court as resting on a particular set of facts. Id. at 946; see NLRB v. Truitt
Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956) (upholding NLRB's final order on basis of Board's position
as original factfinder); NLRB v. Local 294, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 284 F.2d 887 (2d Cir.
1960) (same).
49. See Winter, supra note 37, at 72-73 (rigid distinction between mandatory and non-
mandatory subjects of bargaining is result of such judicial behavior).
50. See H. FRIENDLY, supra note 34, at 146-47. Friendly cites Local 357, Int'l Bhd. of
Teamsters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667 (1961), as one instance in which the Board was accused
of "legislating" because it overspecified its standards. H. FRIENDLY, supra note 34, at
48-51.
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federal judiciary. Unlike policy made by rulemaking, which may be
challenged in the first case in which the rule is at issue, policy an-
nounced in an adjudicatory proceeding is tied to a certain case. An
agency thus can present the court with a result of which the court may
approve despite its doubts about the desirability of the policy articu-
lated in reaching that result. Because an agency is free to give al-
ternative rationales for its decision in an adjudicatory proceeding, the
agency's decision may be upheld even though the court rejects its
primary rationale.51 Even if the court states its reservations while af-
firming the agency's holding, the agency often can proceed with little
or no modification of its policies.52
Moreover, adjudicatory lawmaking permits the agency to administer
policies more flexibly than under rulemaking. Adjudication reduces the
need for accurate foresight by allowing an agency to apply new policy
to prior conduct.53 Indeed, when the agency fails to apply a new rule
retroactively it may find itself accused of legislating rather than ad-
judicating. 4 The agency also is freer to ignore its own precedents and
rules if it proceeds through adjudication. The ambiguity and doctrinal
subtlety of policy announced in a decision gives the agency the flexi-
bility to disregard its own rules selectively in individual cases. 55
51. See, e.g., NLRB v. Local 294, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 284 F.2d 887 (2d Cir. 1960)
(rejecting NLRB's reasoning that picketing at neutral premises is not to be regarded as
privileged primary picketing absent showing that primary employer has permanent estab.
lishment nearby, but enforcing NLRB order on basis of alternative rationale that requests
and threats, when accompanying such picketing, can be used as basis for finding that
Local sought to induce concerted pressure on secondary employer).
52. See Shapiro, supra note 4, at 944-45. An example is NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351
U.S. 149 (1956), in which the Supreme Court upheld the Board's ruling that the employer
had committed an unfair labor practice by claiming that he could not afford to pay
higher wages but refusing to produce information substantiating his claim. The Court,
in accepting the Board's findings of fact that the employer had failed to bargain in good
faith in the particular case, was careful to indicate that it did not automatically follow
that employees are entitled to substantiating evidence in all such circumstances, but that
each case would have to turn upon its facts. Id. at 153-54. The Board nevertheless con-
tinued to impose a duty to disclose such evidence without regard to the employer's good
or bad faith. See Tennessee Chair Co., 126 N.L.R.B. 1357 (1960); Tennessee Coal & Iron
Div., U.S. Steel Corp., 122 N.L.R.B. 1519 (1959).
53. See SEC v. Clhenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947) ("[W]e refuse to say that the
Commission, which had not previously been confronted with the problem .. , was for-
bidden from utilizing [an adjudicatory] proceeding for announcing and applying a new
standard of conduct. . . That such action might have a retroactive effect was not
necessarily fatal to its validity.") (citation omitted); Shapiro, supra note 4, at 952-57
(discussing distinction between adjudication and rulemaking in terms of retroactivity).
54. See NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 780 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(because rule does not take effect until after Board's decision, Board must use rule-
making procedure).
55. See, e.g., NLRB v. Grace Co., 184 F.2d 126, 129 (8th Cir. 1950) (NLRB may apply
or waive rule as facts of given case demand); Shapiro, supra note 4, at 947-52 (agencies
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Finally, adjudicatory lawmaking avoids potential sources of delay
that would prevent the Board from applying new policies as quickly
as it may desire. The Board's ability to apply retroactively rules de-
veloped in adjudication permits an immediate enforcement of policy
changes that would be impossible under rulemaking.56 Unlike rule-
making, adjudicatory lawmaking does not require the Board to delay
applying a new standard until it reviews conduct committed subsequent
to the rule's issuance.57
In issuing its policies through adjudication, the NLRB employs a
lawmaking mechanism that maximizes the likelihood that its rules and
holdings will survive judicial review. Rulemaking, by contrast, in-
creases the chances of judicial intervention. A rule promulgated
through an NLRB rulemaking proceeding could be challenged either
in a preenforcement review of the rule58 or as the Board sought to
enforce an order based on the rule. Although in theory the findings
made in the rulemaking proceeding would be subject to the less
stringent "arbitrary and capricious" standard of judicial review instead
of the more exacting "substantial evidence" standard used to review
adjudication,5" the difference in the standards has little practical im-
freer to disregard policies developed through adjudication than in rulemaking pro-
ceeding). Nevertheless, courts do not always accept such behavior by an agency, and
may indicate in no uncertain terms their displeasure with inconsistently applied standards.
E.g., Seafarers Int'l Union of N. America, Local 777 v. NLRB, 84 Lab. Cas. (CCH)
10,865, at 19,373 (D.C. Cir. 1978); see note 80 infra (discussing Seafarers).
56. See PBW Stock Exch., Inc. v. SEC, 485 F.2d 718, 732 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
416 U.S. 969 (1974) ("[R]ules ordinarily look to the future and are applied prospectively
only .. "); cf. Citizens to Save Spencer County v. EPA, 600 F.2d 844, 879-81 (D.C. Cir.
1979) (rules promulgated through rulemaking proceedings may be applied retroactively
only in limited circumstances).
57. It could also be argued that because promulgated rules are subject to preenforce-
ment review, see Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967), rulemaking
would further delay new policies by increasing the probability of a split in the federal
circuit courts on the propriety of any particular NLRB rule. Although such review,
by providing another avenue for challenging new Board policies, might result in some
additional circuit splits, existing appellate review of NLRB orders is already a preen-
forcement review of sorts. Because the Board must seek enforcement of its orders, see
p. 989 supra, a split in the circuits is possible under the present system when the
NLRB issues orders based on a new standard in cases arising in different circuits. More-
over, there is little incentive for a party concerned about a new rule to engage in a
costly and potentially unnecessary preenforcement challenge under Abbott Laboratories
when it can obtain the equivalent of preenforcement review after the NLRB actually
applies the rule and attempts to have it enforced against the party.
58. See note 57 supra.
59. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (1976) (defining scope of review of agency action, findings and
conclusions); see Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 143 (1967) (substantial
evidence test affords more generous judicial review than arbitrary and capricious test); K.
DAvis, AiamINSrATxIvE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES § 29.00 (1976) (discussing difference between
substantial evidence standard and arbitrary and capricious standard).
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pact. 0 Rulemaking, moreover, would prevent the Board from en-
forcing a new rule retroactively or inconsistently. The NLRB could
not choose the decisions within which the rule would first be appealed,
or as freely formulate its rules in the guise of fact determinations. A
shift to rulemaking thus would result in the courts increasingly sub-
stituting their beliefs on industrial relations for those of the Board.
B. Minimizing Conflict With Congress
Congressional intervention is a second influence on NLRB policies
that is minimized by adjudicatory lawmaking. Rulemaking, by sub-
jecting the Board's standards to congressional oversight, inevitably
would inhibit the NLRB from issuing new rules as freely as it pres-
ently does.61
Most of the NLRB's relations with Congress have little public
visibility and operate on a highly informal, unstructured basis. The
only formal and regular contacts are the confirmation process, 62 the
appropriation process,6 3 and the NLRB's annual report to Congress. 64
The insignificance of these formal contacts is readily apparent: every
presidential nomination for the Board or General Counsel has been
confirmed,0 5 appropriations are approved routinely with little or no
debate, 0 and the annual report is largely ignored.0 7 The congressional
conflicts with the NLRB that do occur are of two types: general
criticism of the Board, its methods, and its fundamental ideology; and
close examination of specific labor policies that Congress finds trou-
60. See Associated Indus. of N.Y. State, Inc. v. United States Dep't of Labor, 487 F.2d
3,42, 349-50 (2d Cir. 1973) (Friendly, J.) (substantial evidence standard and arbitrary and
capricious standard "tend to converge"); K. DAVIS, supra note 59, § 29.01-3 (1977 Supp.)
(difference between substantial evidence standard and arbitrary and capricious standard
is of decreasing importance).
61. See pp. 995-98 infra.
62. See 29 U.S.C. § 153(a), (d) (1976) (President nominates Board members, who serve
staggered five year terms, and General Counsel, who serves for four years); F. McCuL-
LOCH & T. BORNSTEIN, supra note 43, at 107-09 (discussing confirmation process).
63. See F. McCULLOCH & T. BORNSTEIN, supra note 43, at 107, 109-10 (discussing appro-
priation process).
64. See 29 U.S.C. § 153(c) (1976) (Board each fiscal year shall report on cases heard,
decisions rendered, moneys disbursed); F. MCCULLOCH & T. BORNSTEIN, supra note 43, at
107, 110 (discussing annual report).
65. This record is not particularly unique; the Senate rarely challenges a presidential
nomination for membership on a regulatory agency. F. MCCULLOCH & T. BORNSTEIN, supra
note 43, at 107-09. Nevertheless, the White House is generally careful to clear its nominees
with Senate leaders. Id. Only one Board nominee has been seriously challenged by the
Senate. Id.
66. Id. at 109-10. In the recent past, final appropriations have matched appropriations
requests exactly. Id.
67. Id. at 110.
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bling. 68 Informally Congress and the NLRB meet during oversight
hearings,6 9 substantive hearings on labor legislation,7 0 or when in-
dividual congressmen contact the agency.71 Of these, the oversight
hearings, which attempt to survey the policies of the agency over a
number of years, are the most problematic for the Board. Even if the
hearing results in little substantive change, the probing frequently is
embarrassing and often paralyzes the agency for months as its top
personnel prepare for it.72 Oversight hearings on the NLRB, though
rare,7 3 have been used to harass and embarrass the Board.74 Congres-
sional hearings on specific policies of the Board are a more frequent
source of intervention.75 A policy-specific hearing may either be
prompted by heavy lobbying or develop out of a substantive hearing
on related legislation.76
68. See id. at 110-12.
69. Id. The last two such hearings were in 1968 and 1961. 1968 Hearings, supra note
6; Administration of the Labor-Management Relations Act by the NLRB: Hearings Be-
fore the Subcomm. on NLRB of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 87th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1961) [hereinafter cited as 1961 Hearings].
70. F. McCuLLOCH & T. BORNSTEIN, supra note 43, at 110, 112. The most recent
significant set of such hearings were those conducted on the Labor Reform Act of 1977.
Labor Reform Act of 1977: Hearings on H.R. 8410 Before the Subcomm. on Labor-
Management Relations of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1977); Labor Reform Act of 1977: Hearings on S. 1883 Before the Subcomm. on
Labor of the Senate Comm. on Human Resources, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
71. Such contacts may involve courtesy visits of Board nominees, informal communica-
tion arising from congressional investigations, or most typically, letters of inquiry request-
ing information on a constituent's case pending before the Board. F. McCULLOCH & T.
BORNSTEIN, supra note 43, at 108, 112.
72. W. CARY, POLITICS AND THE REGULATORY AGENCIES 41 (1967).
73. See note 69 supra (only two such hearings in last two decades).
74. F. MCCULLOCHt & T. BORNSTEIN, supra note 43, at 110-12. The 1961 oversight hear-
ings of the House Subcommittee on the NLRB, 1961 Hearings, supra note 69, were con-
ducted primarily to embarrass the Republicans and the Eisenhower Board. Scher, Condi-
tions for Legislative Control, in R. WOLFINGER, READINGS ON CONGRESS 404, 417 (1971). The
subcommittee's investigation hindered the NLRB so acutely that the White House, the
AFL-CIO, and the Kennedy Board all pressured the Chairman to cut short the investiga-
tion and leave the agency alone in the future. Id. at 414-15. For an indication of how
antagonistic such hearings can be, see 1968 Hearings, supra note 6, at 776-805 (Chairman
Sam Ervin's interrogation of Board Chairman Frank W. McCulloch); F. MCCULLOCH & T.
BORNSTEIN, supra note 43, at 111 (describing hearings as "attack by promanagement repre-
sentatives on what they saw as the prolabor, Kennedy-Johnson NLRB of the 1960's").
75. General oversight hearings are highly unpopular. Scher, supra note 74, at 407-16,
419. This unpopularity is due largely to the low political payoff of engaging in such
hearings as compared to promoting constituent services or enacting legislation, id. at
409-10, and to the view that participation in hearings is tedious work that invariably makes
powerful enemies and rarely finds new friends, id. at 411-16.
76. See F. MCCULLOCH & T. BORNSTEIN, sutbra note 43, at 110-12. A hearing conducted
to develop a legislative solution to a substantive problem can lead to a full investigation
of the agency involved as the committee becomes aware of how the law is being ad-
ministered. See Scher, supra note 74, at 423 (79th and 80th Congresses started out to
regulate overly aggressive union activity but ended up overhauling NLRB).
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The advantages of adjudicatory lawmaking for an agency concerned
with congressional review are substantial. Adjudicatory lawmaking
permits the agency to adopt rules without clearly articulating its policies
and their implications. By developing a rule gradually over several
years, the agency can in effect "hide the ball."7' In leaving its doctrine
ambiguous, often seemingly restricted to the facts of a certain case, the
Board can legislate in controversial areas without giving critics a clear
and final rule to attack.7 8
Adjudication also gives the agency the opportunity to avoid clarifying
the many issues underlying the rule. Unlike the rulemaking process, in
which an agency is required to specify the analytical and empirical
grounds for its decision,79 adjudication permits major policy changes
to be made with little or no explanation. Indeed, it is a common
criticism of the Board that it often will announce such changes in an
apparently innocuous manner, frequently limiting its analytical discus-
sion to one or two paragraphs.80 The Board thereby not only avoids
77. Shapiro, sukra note 4, at 940. The NLRB's contract-bar rules, under which existing
collective agreements may bar a petition for a certification election, are an example of an
instance when the Board has hidden the ball "from those who are not initiated into the
mysteries of [the NLRB] and its works." Id. Shapiro reasons that even the most ex-
perienced practitioner must have difficulty in correctly stating a rule that has been
developed over a number of decisions and for which no clear codification exists. Id. at
941. The validity of his observation is confirmed by Bernstein's study of the labor bar.
Bernstein, supra note 6, at 582-87.
78. See Bernstein, supra note 6, at 591-92 (Board puts "fuzz" on its rules by fastening
onto peculiarities of cases rather than developing clear statements of agency policy); cf.
1968 Hearings, supra note 6, at 528 (Howard Lesnick) (NLRB's timidity has led to
"passion" for case-by-case decisionmaking that permits it to state facts "without really
attempting to come to grips with concrete issues").
79. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1976) ("[T]he agency shall incorporate in the rules adopted a
concise general statement of their basis and purpose."); see 1968 Hearings, supra note 6,
at 146 (statement of Cornelius J. Peck) (discussing how NLRB's use of adjudication
results in decisions that have little empirical basis); cf. Getman & Goldberg, supra note
45, at 681-84 (NLRB has no special expertise to determine impact of employer speech or
conduct on exercise of employee rights).
80. See 1968 Hearings, sut/ra note 6, at 146 (statement of Cornelius J. Peck). In many
of its decisions immediately following NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969),
in which the Board's right to issue bargaining orders was affirmed, the NLRB provided
little or no discussion of the issues, but simply used "the language of the Supreme Court
as a formula to be invoked when the Board chose to issue a bargaining order." Getman
& Goldberg, supra note 45, at 684.
A number of courts have expressed frustration with the Board's unwillingness to provide
analytical bases for its decisions. See, e.g., Seafarers Int'l Union of N. America, Local 777
v. NLRB, 84 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 10,865, at 19,373 (D.C. Cir. 1978) ("Not only has the NLRB
repeatedly reached diametrically opposite conclusions on the basis of virtually identical
fact situations .... but moreover, it has done so in a series of opinions which typically
offer no explanation for their result other than a recitation of the pertinent facts ....")
(citations omitted); NLRB v. General Stencils, Inc., 438 F.2d 894, 901 (2d Cir. 1971)
(Friendly, J.) (quoting NLRB v. American Cable Sys., Inc., 427 F.2d 446, 449 (5th Cir.),
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antagonizing powerful interests that may disagree with its assumptions
regarding industrial relations, but also prevents attacks on the validity
of a rule's empirical and analytical foundation.
Perhaps the greatest advantage of adjudication in avoiding con-
gressional scrutiny is that it presents no firm and final resolution of a
policy issue, but only an incremental and ambiguous step. Unlike a
promulgated rule, which generally represents a firm statement of agency
policy that can be amended only through new rulemaking proceed-
ings,8 ' a rule announced in an adjudicatory proceeding may appear as
only a step in the gradual evolution of a general doctrine . 2 It is
difficult for a congressional committee to justify spending valuable
time on a matter for which the agency has announced no clear and
final standard. By the time a doctrine is fully developed, however, it
often has been incorporated into the system too completely to arouse
much organized opposition. 83
Moreover, adjudicatory lawmaking permits an agency to adopt a
new policy without giving notice to powerful interest groups that
would have lobbied intensely to prevent the rule's official promulga-
tion. 4 Once a rule is a fait accompli, congressional committees often
lack the leverage to pressure a reversal.8 5
Adjudication has the additional advantage of carrying with it the
aura of fact determination and impartial application of the law. Un-
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 957 (1970)) (Board's decision was "a litany, reciting conclusions by
rote without factual explanations"); cf. NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 100 S. Ct. 856, 867 (1980)
(Board's opinion not rationally based on articulated facts).
81. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(5), 553 (1976); see note 2 supra.
82. The NLRB has long argued that adjudicatory lawmaking facilitates the step-by-
step policymaking it believes to be necessary in industrial relations. See p. 986 supra.
Its argument has found at least some congressional support. See SENATE COMM. ON HUMAN
RESOURCES, LABOR LAW REFORM ACT OF 1978, S. REP. No. 628, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 63-64
(1978) (separate views of Senators Hatch and Hayakawa); HOUSE COMM. ON EDUCATION
AND LABOR, LABOR REFORM ACT OF 1977, H. REP. No. 637, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 69-73
(1977) (minority views); 123 CONG. REC. H10,649 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1977) (remarks of Rep.
Erlenhorn).
83. The Board's assumptions regarding the voting behavior of employees is an example
of NLRB policy that evolved over many years only to be recently challenged on the basis
of an empirical study. See J. GETMAN, S. GOLDBERG, 9- J. HERMAN, UNION REPRESENTATION
ELECTIONS: LAW AND REALITY (1976). The study challenges some of the most fundamental
of the Board's policies, id. at 139-41, many of which have been developed over the last
three to four decades, see id. at 7-26. One highly controversial finding is the study's con-
clusion that employees are not particularly attentive to election campaigns, id. at 140-41,
and that misrepresentations, threats, and promises, therefore, do not have the impact the
Board presumes them to have, id. at 8-11, 147-49.
84. Cf. I K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 6.38 (2d ed. 1978) (SEC could not
have adopted its Cady, Roberts & Co. rule, see 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961), by rulemaking because
pressures from industry and congressional committees would have been too great).
85. See id.
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like rulemaking, in which a congressional committee may intercede in
the preliminary stages,8s procedural due process considerations prohibit
the use of political pressure to influence an adjudicated ruling.3 7
The NLRB thus avoids many congressional challenges to its specific
policies simply by failing to present a clear target.8s Given the inherent
divisiveness of labor politics and the potential for intervention by the
congressional committees specializing in labor relations, it is doubtful
that the Board's rules would survive as readily if the agency were to
formulate policy through rulemaking rather than adjudication.
The contentious nature of labor politics is apparent in the opera-
tions of the congressional committees that oversee the Board and its
policies. Members attracted to service on the House Education and
Labor Committee 9 are typically stubborn and ideologically committed,
resulting in a highly partisan and unstable committee willing to bicker
endlessly on even trivial issues.90 Although the Committee members
86. See IV. CARY, supra note 72, at 45-55 (listing cases when Congress has interfered in
agency rulemaking proceedings); K. DAVIS, supra note 16, § 6.03 (congressional supervision
can be quite effective in reaching contemplated rulemaking); cf. Pillsbury Co. v. FTC,
354 F.2d 952, 964 (5th Cir. 1966) (Congress may intervene in legislative but not in
judicial function of agency).
87. See Pillsbury Co. v. FTC, 354 F.2d 952, 963-65 (5th Cir. 1966) (committee's pressure
on two commissioners with regard to divestiture decision violates due process of law); cf.
D.C. Fed'n of Civic Ass'ns v. Volpe, 459 F.2d 1231, 1246 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405
U.S. 1030 (1972) (congressional pressure on Secretary of Transportation to approve bridge
project is invalid influence under relevant statutory scheme).
88. To Congress, this evasion may not be entirely undesirable. So long as the NLRB
refuses to assume the clear, controversial positions that would invite powerful interest
groups to demand specific legislation, Congress is relieved of a problematic and divisive
issue. See note 106 infra.
89. The House Education and Labor Committee and the Senate Human Resources
Committee, the parent committees of the NLRB, are responsible for oversight of the
Board. F. MCCULLOCI{ & T. BORNSTEIN, supra note 43, at 110. Nevertheless, other com-
mittees, such as the Senate Judiciary Committee in 1968, occasionally engage in oversight
of the NLRB. 1968 Hearings, supra note 6. Most labor legislation, of course, is within the
jurisdiction of the two Labor Committees. See F. MCCULLOCH & T. BORNSTEIN, supra note
43, at 112.
90. R. FENNO, CONGRESSMEN IN CosMmrirs 84-87 (1973); Fenno, The House Committee
on Education and Labor, in R. WOLFINGER, READINGS ON CoNGREss 180, 180-81 (1971). One
Democratic member of the Committee is quoted as stating, "It's a very discouraging
Committee. You can't get a resolution praising God through that Committee without
having a three day battle over it. . . . It's about the most difficult Committee around."
Id. at 180. Fenno identifies three reasons why the House Education and Labor Committee
has great difficulty arriving at a consensus: the controversial and partisan issues under its
jurisdiction, id. at 181-83; the issue-oriented, contentious, and deeply committed personali-
ties of its members, id. at 184-88; and the fiercely competitive way it makes decisions, id.
at 188-92.
Fenno's study analyzed six House committees between 1955 and 1966, and for com-
parison looked briefly at the corresponding Senate committees. R. FENNO, supra, at xv-xvi.
In a follow-up study of the period 1967 to 1972, the author concluded that, at least for
the House Education and Labor Committee, the decisionmaking process had not changed.
Id. at xvii, 288.
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generally adhere to party positions, any ambiguity in party doctrine
shatters the Committee into numerous factions. 91 The Senate Human
Resources Committee9 2 is less divisive, 93 but both Committees are
among the most partisan committees within their respective houses .
4
Several commentators have recognized the importance of avoiding
political conflict if an agency is to function effectively. 95 Given the
congressional labor committees' proclivity for lengthy debates, policies
developed through rulemaking could be stifled if the NLRB, like most
agencies, sought unofficial congressional blessing before promulgating
a controversial rule.90 Although congressional committees might refrain
from organized participation in the rulemaking process, it is unlikely
that highly partisan committee members would fail to attempt to exert
their influence individually. The prospect of such congressional inter-
vention almost certainly would inhibit an agency as politically timid as
the NLRB97 from promulgating rules that might generate political
confrontation.
III. Conflict Minimization and the Development of
National Labor Policy
As public attitudes toward labor relations change, the NLRB fre-
quently conforms its policies to the new national sentiment.98 The
primary source of the NLRB's political responsiveness is the appoint-
ment of new Board members by each administration99 and their con-
91. R. FENNO, supra note 90, at 76-79; see Fenno, supra note 90, at 180-81 (many
Republican members seek to promote such internal discord).
92. Formerly this committee was the Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee.
93. R. FENNO, supra note 90, at 175-76.
94. Id. at 84-87, 174-75. The Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee is described
as the only one of the six Senate committees studied that displayed a noteworthy degree
of partisanship in its decisionmaking. Id. at 174-75.
95. See 1968 Hearings, supra note 6, at 528-29 (Howard Lesnick) (NLRB's fear of
political conflict and controversy has lead to excessive timidity in formulating labor
policy); cf. id. at 924 (Ralph K. Winter) (NLRB overly cautious in making policy).
96. See W. CARY, supra note 72, at 53 ("[A]gencies seldom take controversial steps under
their rule making power which do not have some support from Congress."). Regulatory
commissions are especially careful not to take action if the chairman of one of their
parent committees objects. Id.
Unless the NLRB could find a coalition within each committee that would support
its rule, the Board would face the dilemma of either issuing a rule and risking a hostile
legislative reaction, or negotiating with various Committee members to make the rule more
palatable, a prospect that would also present difficulties, given the contentious nature of
the House Committee.
97. See note 95 supra.
98. See note 39 supra.
99. See Summers, Politics, Policy Making, and the NLRB, 6 SYRACUSE L. Rv. 93, 99-
101 (1954); Winter, supra note 37, at 65-66.
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firmation by the Senate. 00 The Board therefore often changes its views
dramatically within several years after a new President is elected.' 0 '
Adjudicatory lawmaking, by minimizing conflicts with Congress and
the federal courts, has permitted the Board the flexibility to modify
its rules. A shift to rulemaking would expose the Board to increased
congressional and judicial intervention that would inevitably hamper
its ability to respond quickly to new political conditions.
By making the NLRB more susceptible to judicial intervention,
NLRB rulemaking would result in the courts more frequently sub-
stituting their beliefs on labor policy for those of the Board. Because
the courts are inherently less politically responsive than the NLRB,
national labor policy would conform more slowly to changing political
circumstances. Increased congressional oversight would subject the
Board to delay, administrative inconvenience, and harassment that
would inhibit the NLRB from promulgating new policies that might
generate political conflict. The NLRB, already timid and cautious,
would become increasingly hesitant to modify its policies. Thus a shift
to rulemaking would have the paradoxical result of creating a less
politically responsive national labor policy by exposing newly formu-
lated NLRB standards to greater congressional scrutiny.
In addition to promoting continuity and harmony in American in-
dustrial relations, a partial insulation of labor policy from the factious
environment of congressional labor politics may have substantial ad-
vantages for Congress. A national labor policy that responds quickly
to political developments reflects the balance of power in the in-
dustrial relations system. A shift to rulemaking, by hampering the
ability of the Board to respond to new political conditions, would
result in a disequilibrium between these conditions and national labor
policy that eventually would have to be resolved by Congress. 10 2 Con-
100. Although Board members are rarely challenged in their confirmation hearings,
see p. 993 supra, the Executive generally clears its nominees with relevant Senate leaders
and also makes "inquiries in labor-management circles." F. MCCULLOCH & T. BORNSTEIN,
supra note 43, at 107-08.
101. See Summers, supra note 99, at 99-101 (new NLRB members "are children of the
ballot box"); Winter, supra note 37, at 65-66 (citing examples of NLRB policies that have
been reversed soon after new administration appoints new Board members); cf. 1968
Hearings, supra note 6, at 135-36 (Cornelius J. Peck) (Kennedy Board rapidly reversed
many of Eisenhower Board's rulings).
Board members are also "sensitive to the temper of the times," often responding to
political changes that have not yet been reflected in the ballot box. See Summers, supra
note 99, at 99-101.
102. The Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-
115 (1976)), was an example of congressional response to such a disequilibrium. Congress,
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gress, though clearly sensitive to changes in popular sentiments toward
labor relations, has had great difficulties in enacting labor legisla-
tion.10 3 Reforms invariably have been enacted only after public dis-
satisfaction had reached sufficient proportions that consensus could
be found for legislative change. 04 A politically responsive NLRB
allows national labor policy to be modified without requiring public
dissatisfaction to reach the high level necessary for legislative reform.' °5
In addition, the NLRB as a politically responsive agency relieves Con-
gress of the contentious and burdensome chore of reforming labor
policy as public attitudes toward industrial relations change. 0 6 The
ability of the Board to modify labor policy before public dissatisfaction
peaks, and thus to defuse conditions that might otherwise require
legislative reform, may be impaired if it is required to proceed through
rulemaking.
Nevertheless, there are obvious benefits associated with closer judicial
and congressional supervision of NLRB decisionmaking. Such review
serves as a check on arbitrary behavior. 07 Rulemaking is more demo-
cratic than adjudication because it requires agencies to issue their
rules with greater clarity and specificity'0 8 and permits the participa-
tion of all interested parties. 09 The need of Congress to obtain a clear
and precise statement of agency policy to determine whether the legisla-
tive mandate is being administered in accordance with congressional
intent is better satisfied by agency rulemaking than by adjudication. 10
prompted by growing popular dissatisfaction with the antilabor bias of federal judges,
severely limited the jurisdiction of the federal courts to issue injunctions in labor disputes.
See Note, Labor Injunctions and Judge-made Labor Law: The Contemporary Role of
Norris-LaGuardia, 70 YALE L.J. 70, 71-76 (1960).
103. See notes 32, 34 & 95 supra.
104. See note 34 supra.
105. See Summers, supra note 99, at 100 (Board, "by bending to the wind," can make
"small shifts or gradual changes" that Congress is incapable of making, "thereby pre-
serving a measure of continuity and stability" between major legislative enactments);
Winter, supra note 37, at 65 (politically responsive NLRB may be desirable in light of
difficulties that Congress has in enacting labor legislation, and resulting lengthy delays
between legislative directives).
106. See 1968 Hearings, supra note 6, at 526 (Howard Lesnick) ("[W]e should always
bear in mind that the Legislature has the discretion not to legislate, and that in an area
so characterized by sharply conflicting and emotion-laden issues it may be the wiser course
to exercise that discretion .... [T]he Board serves as a lightning rod for the Legislature.");
cf. H. FRIENDLY, supra note 34, at 166-68 (congressmen realize that legislative inaction is
often safest political strategy); Scher, supra note 74, at 413-14 (congressmen will tend to
avoid agency review if it might provoke powerful interests).
107. See NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 775-80 (1969) (Douglas, J., dis-
senting).
108. See pp. 995-96 supra.
109. 1 K. DAvIs, supra note 84, § 6.38 (adjudicatory lawmaking undemocratic because
it creates policies affecting unrepresented parties).
110. See 1968 Hearings, supra note 6, at 906 (Henry J. Friendly) (quoting former FCC
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Clearly, there is no simple answer to whether rulemaking or ad-
judication should be employed. But to analyze the question of NLRB
rulemaking solely in terms of procedural fairness is to disregard the
critical issue of the NLRB's relationship to Congress and the federal
judiciary. Unfortunately, Congress in its recent attempt to require
some NLRB rulemaking"1 nowhere signified its awareness of the
critical trade-off between procedural fairness and politically responsive
development of national labor policy. 112 If Congress is to require rule-
making, it should first determine that the benefits of increased pro-
cedural fairness and greater congressional and judicial oversight of the
NLRB outweigh the disadvantages of inhibiting politically responsive
policymaking. For Congress to require NLRB rulemaking solely on the
basis of procedural considerations would be to use the wrong analytical
framework to resolve a far more complex dilemma.
Commissioner Lee Loevinger) (" 'It is a good working hypothesis that the agencies have
uniformly failed to promulgate specific and clear policies and standards not from an
inability, ignorance, or ineptitude, but from unwillingness to limit themselves in the
exercise of power.'")
Ill. See p. 987 sufira.
112. See, e.g., SENATE COMM. ON HUMAN RESOURCES, LABOR LAW REFORM Aar OF 1978,
S. REP. No. 628, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 18-20 (1978); HousE COMM. ON EDUCATION AND LABOR,
LAnOR REFORM ACT OF 1977, H. REP. No. 637, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 35-39 (1977).
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